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INTRODUCTION
In refusing to allow an expert witness to express his opinion about the reliability of
the eyewitness identifications, the trial judge misapprehended the law on the role of
experts and on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. In doing so, he abused his
discretion. He similarly exceeded his discretion when he decided before trial, without
even assessing the need for the expert testimony, to bar the expert from giving an opinion
on the reliability of the identifications.
The trial judge further erred in admitting the eyewitnesses5 identifications.
Numerous factors interfered with the eyewitnesses' observations, including a disguise,
fear, the presence of guns, repeated exposure to suggestion, and the fact that the
identifications occurred two months after the crime. Because this case hinged entirely on
the accuracy of the identifications, the trial judge's errors severely harmed the defense.

I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
EXCLUDING THE EXPERT'S OPINION BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE LAW AND HIS REFUSAL
TO CONSIDER THE NEED FOR EXERT TESTIMONY
A.

The Trial Judge Erred in Concluding that the
Expert Could not Address the Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification

The trial judge erroneously concluded that the expert witness would invade the
jury's province by addressing the reliability of the eyewitness identifications. This Court
and the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have plainly established that experts may offer an
opinion "as to facts that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at
issue was [or was not] satisfied." Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.. 112
F.3d 1207,1212-1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997): see State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,1363 (Utah
1993) (experts may render opinion on "a factual issue to be determined by the jury."). In
fact, this Court has consistently allowed expert opinions on factual matters that the jury
must ultimately decide. State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,1J41, 27 P.3d 1115 (medical examiner
properly "applied" physical evidence to the facts in concluding death was a homicide);
State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42,ffl|13-14,5 P.3d 642 (approving of opinion on mentally
impaired person's cognitive capacity to fabricate); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,332 (Utah
1991) (allowing opinion on whether fire had been intentionally set).
The reliability of the eyewitness identifications below was a factual issue, not a
legal conclusion, upon which the expert could offer an opinion. This Court recently ruled
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that trial judges may properly admit expert testimony on the reliability of a specific
eyewitness identification. In State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, fW, 27 P.3d 1133, this
Court held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on an eyewitness
identification because the expert did not have knowledge about the specific facts of the
case. Id. Specifically, the expert only intended to "lecture to the jury as to how they
should judge the evidence." Id. at ^[43. This Court reasoned that the trial court acted
properly because the expert did not offer "'an opinion concerning whether any witness9
identification was accurate.'" Id. at ^J44 (quoting the trial court's ruling).
In contrast, the expert in this case sought to offer the very type of opinion evidence
that this Court endorsed in Butterfield. In particular, the expert was prepared to give "an
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious question as to
it's reliability." R. 317: 216. The trial judge misapprehended the expert's and the jury's
roles in excluding the expert's opinion. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, ft4,27 P.3d 1133.
The State attempts to justify the trial judge's decision by speculating that the judge
excluded the expert's opinion for a variety of possible reasons. State's Brief at 9-15. The
State proposes that the judge may have concluded that the expert might have confused the
issues, delayed the case, or caused the jury to attach too much weight to the expert's
testimony. State's Brief at 12-14.
Mr. Hollen does not dispute that trial judges have such discretion. Nevertheless,
the State's arguments are ineffectual. In thefirstplace, because the State raises the
3

possible grounds for the trial judge's decision for the first time in this appeal, the State
waived consideration of those issues. State v. HelmicL 2000 UT 70, ^[8, 9 P.3d 164.
Even if this Court could consider the State's claims, the record does not support
that any of the listed grounds for exclusion ever factored into the trial judge's decision.
The trial judge's cursory decision indicates that he believed that it was the jury's role to
decide the reliability of eyewitness identifications:
Q [defense counsel]: Based on all these factors and
what you know about the case, Dr. Dodd, do you have an
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case
raises serious question as to it's reliability?
Mr. Shepherd [prosecutor]: I'm going to object to that,
your Honor. I think these are matters the jury can decide.
The Court: Objection is sustained. This is within the
province of the jury, Counsel.
R. 317: 216-17.
The only other insight into the trial judge's decision occurred at the hearing on the
motion for new trial, almost two years after the trial. There, in denying the motion, the
trial judge expressed his personal contempt for the need for expert testimony on
eyewitness identification:
The Court: As I recall, we gave the so-called eye witness
identification instruction, did we not? That two or three page
piece of workfromZimmerman? From the Supreme Court?
Ms. Stam: Yes. I think it was a unanimous decision.
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The Court: I'm not prepared, Ms. Stam, at this time to
reconsider a ruling during the course of trial. My thinking, I
think that if it warrants appeal, and certainly in your judgment I
suppose it does, they ought to get on about it.
But at that time, and as of this time, even having learned
quite a bit since then, I'm not persuaded we need to have
someone come down and tell us that witnesses don't know what
they see. So your request is denied as to the motion for a new
trial.
R. 318:4-5.
Both of these rulings evince the trial judge's personal dislike for expert opinions on
the reliability of eyewitness identification and his misunderstanding of the role of experts
and the jury in assessing the accuracy of that evidence. But, the rulings do not mention
any concern for avoiding confusion, waste of time, or attaching too much value to the
expert's opinion as the State proposes. Because these matters were not at issue in this
case, they served as no grounds for excluding the expert's opinion. At the very least, Mr.
Hollen deserves the benefit of the doubt on discerning the trial judge's reasoning since the
trial judge refused to allow defense counsel to raise her objections at trial.
Given the trial judge's misunderstanding of the law, his decision "exceedfed] the
limits of reasonability." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. When trial judges exclude expert
testimony based on "a misperception of the law," an abuse of discretion results. Walker v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335,343 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also Gawv. State.
798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Here, the trial judge mistakenly assumed that
the rules of evidence prevented experts from addressing the reliability of eyewitness
5

identification. That false belief exceeded the trial judge's discretion.
The State cites several cases that it claims supports the trial judge's decision. But,
those cases are premised on the now discredited assumption that expert testimony on
eyewitness identification does not constitute scientific knowledge and that the weaknesses
in eyewitness identification are a matter of common sense for the jury. United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1996), cert, denied 519 U.S. 1141 (1997) (because
eyewitness identification is not a specialized field of study, jury alone decides reliability);
United State v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 924-25 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1029 (1994)
(defendant failed to show expert eyewitness testimony constituted scientific knowledge);
United States v. Purham. 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony not needed
because jurors understand intricacies of eyewitness identification); United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding expert testimony on eyewitness
identification unreliable and ruling that jury adequately appreciated the problems with that
evidence). These holdings contradict current understanding and the present state of the
law. Thus, they serve as no basis for justifying the trial judge's decision.

B.

The Trial Judge Further Abused His Discretion
in Excluding the Expert's Opinion Based on His
Misunderstanding of the Law and Research on
Eyewitness Identification

Aside from the trial judge's misapprehension of the law on the role of experts, his
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misunderstanding of the science and the law on eyewitness identification and his contempt
for that field of study constituted an abuse of discretion. Throughout the proceedings, the
trial judge doubted the need for expert testimony and viewed the limitations of eyewitness
identification as "common knowledge." R. 316: 9. Given the extensive law that holds
directly to the contrary, the trial judge's false notions were an abuse of discretion. Walker,
844 P.2d at 343; Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1134.
The State contends that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and that his
personal views on eyewitness identification evidence did not amount to a
misunderstanding of the law. State's Brief at 16-18. Admittedly, the trial judge allowed
the expert to testify and he instructed the jury on the limitations of eyewitness
identification. But, at every stage of the proceedings, he also belittled the research into
eyewitness identification and he expressed doubt about the need for expert testimony.
Thus, although the judge appears to have felt compelled to follow this Court's precedents
on eyewitness identification evidence, he doubted its validity.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial judge eliminated any doubt that
his personal views affected his decision to exclude the expert's opinion. There, he
described this Court's opinion in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as a "piece of
work." R. 318:4. The State conspicuously fails to mention this comment in its brief. The
trial judge similarly stated that even though he had learned a lot about eyewitness
identification evidence since the trial he still believed that the jury did not "need to have
7

someone come down and tell us that witnesses don't know what they see." R. 318: 5.
Clearly, the trial judge's misapprehensions on eyewitness identification influenced his
refusal to allow the expert to render an opinion.
Further contrary to the State's protestations, an abuse of discretion also results
when trial judges render decisions without considering all "pertinent facts." Kallas v.
Kallas. 614 P.2d 641,646 (Utah 1980). This basic concept is not "tangential[]M or
confusing as the State's claims. State's Brief at 15. Rather, a decision before trial to
exclude an expert's opinion regardless of the state of the evidence and without knowing
whether any need exists for that testimony certainly qualifies as an abuse of discretion.
Judges properly exercise their discretion by making "fully informed" decisions, rather than
deciding whether to exclude an expert's opinion even before any facts are presented at
trial. Id at 646.

C.

Withholding the Expert's Opinion on the
Central Issue in the Case Harmed the Defense

Because this case hinged on the reliability of the eyewitness identifications, the
exclusion of the expert's opinion harmed the defense. The State presented no evidence at
all to link Mr. Hollen to the crime other than the eyewitness identification testimony. But,
without the expert's opinion, the jury had no means of weighing the competing evidence
on the identifications. The jurors only knew that despite numerous problems with the
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eyewitness observations, four eyewitnesses had identified Mr. Hollen as the robber. Had
the jury known that the expert concluded that the identifications were unreliable, it would
have had an evidentiary basis for an acquittal. Instead, the jurors were forced to rely on
the eyewitnesses' credibility and their stated beliefs in the accuracy of their identifications.
Given jurors' unfamiliarity with eyewitness identification problems, they needed expert
testimony to reconcile the competing evidence and to explain that the eyewitnesses were
sincere but wrong. Without expert guidance on reliability, the jury reached the only
reasonable conclusion it could in the absence of an expert's opinion.

II.

THE EYEWITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS WERE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY UNRELIABLE

The trial judge also erred in admitting the eyewitnesses' unreliable identifications.
Significant problems plagued the eyewitnesses' perceptions. First, the heavy set robber's
disguise seriously interfered with all of the eyewitnesses' observations. As Dr. Dodd
explained, research has shown that "the concealment by disguise is particularly disruptive
of the ability to remember" faces. R. 315:98. Additionally, all of the eyewitnesses'
memories were influenced by the composite sketch of the disguised man. Further, the use
of guns and an unusual disguise coupled with the presence of two assailants created
significant distractions and divided the eyewitnesses' attention. And, the fact that the
eyewitnesses did not identify the robbers until two months after the crime diminishes the
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reliability of their memories.
Each of the eyewitnesses also had a limited ability to perceive the disguised man.
Oscar divided his attention throughout the encounter, experienced an extremely high
degree of fear, identified Mr. Hollen in a suggestive photo array that included only three
pictures that matched the assailant's description, took several minutes to identify Mr.
Hollen's picture, believed beforehand that the disguised man's picture was included in the
array, was informed by the police that he had picked the correct picture., and gave
inconsistent reports about whether he had accurately identified Mr. Hollen.
Likewise, Channing only saw the assailants clearly for 20 to 30 seconds while Dave
Peterson fetched the key to the vault room. Initially, he was unaware that a robbery was
taking place. Channing also experienced sufficient fear to cause him to cry. Two months
later, he observed Mr. Hollen on television under highly suggestive circumstances.
Channing also identified Mr. Hollen in a suggestive photo array after which the police
violated identification procedure guidelines and confirmed the accuracy of his photo
identification. Then, at the line-up and at subsequent court proceedings he was repeatedly
exposed to Mr. Hollen.
Lou suggestively learned from Channing that Mr. Hollen had been arrested. Even
though Lou arguably had the best opportunity to observe the disguised man, he could not
affirmatively identify Mr. Hollen at the line-up. Also at the line-up, Lou overheard
victimsfromother robberies mention Mr. Hollen's alleged involvement in other crimes,
10

suggesting that Mr. Hollen was the perpetrator. Despite being in position to see the
disguised man, Lou mistakenly believed that the other assailant wore the sweatshirt.
Similar problems arose with Jill's testimony. She did not perceive thata robbery
was occurring until well after the group entered the vault room and after she experienced
prolonged confusion. Her only opportunity to view the disguised man occurred in the
vault room when she was confused, experiencing a high level of fear, and was distracted
by emptying the safe and observing the other victims being tied up. She had a poor
memory of the disguised man's clothes because she consciously tried to suppress her
memory of the crime. Suggestion also infected her line-up identification. Before viewing
the line-up, Jill overheard the victims of the Million Dollar Saloon robbery discussing that
crime. She also believed the disguised man would be in the line-up and she admitted that
Mr. Hollen's appearance most closely matched her description of the assailant.
These facts distinguish this case from State v. Ramkez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
Most notably, the identifications here occurred two months after the crime when memories
had faded as opposed to less than an hour in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. Suggestion also
permeated the identifications. Although the witnesses in Ramirez identified that defendant
at a suggestive show-up, the fact that the identification occurred within a short time after
the crime outweighed the suggestiveness. Id. The identifications in this case were much
more suggestive given the lengthy time gap, Channing's spotting Mr. Hollen under highly
incriminating circumstances on television, the incriminating photo array that included only
11

three possible choices, and line-up procedures that violated Justice Department guidelines.
National Institute for Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement (1999).
This Court also apparently was not aware in Ramirez of the potent effect a disguise
has on eyewitness identification. Although this Court expressed concern in that case that
the defendant wore a scarf over his face except his eyes, there was no evidence on the
current research on altering a person's appearance. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-84. As Dr.
Dodd testified, alterations by use of a disguise have an "enormous influence" on
witnesses' ability to encode a face. R. 317: 205,217. Had this Court known of this
research, its decision may well have been different.
This case is much more similar to the facts in State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, 984
P.2d 376. The concerns this Court expressed in that case are equally relevant here.
Specifically, the witnesses (1) had a limited opportunity to view the assailant; (2) divided
their attention on the use of guns; (3) offered conflicting reports about the assailants'
clothing; (4) experienced fear; and, (5) failed to agree on whether the defendant was the
robber. Id at ^[23-24, 29. Suggestion also infected both cases, including the
eyewitnesses' learning that the defendant was accused of other crimes and their discussing
their observations among each other. WL at lfl|23-24. The use of a disguise in both cases
further connects them and weakens the reliability of the identifications. Id. at 1J23.
Because the only evidence linking Mr. Hollen to the crime was the eyewitness
12

identification evidence, the erroneous admission of the eyewitnesses' testimony harmed
the defense. The absence of evidence prevents the Sate from establishing harmlessness
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, f30, 973 P.2d 404.

CONCLUSION
Because the trial judge prejudiced the defense in refusing to allow admissible
expert testimony and in admitting unreliable eyewitness testimony, reversal and a remand
for a new trial are required.

SUBMITTED this A ^ day of October, 2001.

K£NTR.HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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